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Abstract 
 
Recent project-management literature and high-profile disasters—the financial crisis, the BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the Fukushima nuclear accident—illustrate the flaws of 
traditional risk models for complex projects. This research examines how various groups with 
interests in the Arctic offshore define risks. The findings link the wicked problem framework and 
the emerging paradigm of Project Management of the Second Order (PM-2). Wicked problems 
are problems that are unstructured, complex, irregular, interactive, adaptive, and novel. The 
authors synthesize literature on the topic to offer strategies for navigating wicked problems, 
provide new variables to deconstruct traditional risk models, and integrate objective and 
subjective schools of risk analysis.   
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Introduction 
The public’s trust in the effectiveness of traditional risk management practices has been shattered 
through recent disasters such as the financial crisis in 2008, the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
in 2010 and the Fukushima radiation release in 2011. Although these disasters come from very 
different risk management contexts – finance, oil and gas and the nuclear power industry – with 
unique organizational risk profiles, all of them underestimated the degree of systems complexity 
and relied on traditional risk models. Traditional risk models perceive risk as primarily objective 
and identifiable, and utilize primarily reductionist, linear processes such as mathematical and 
statistical models. Pollack’s (2007) research confirms this trend in the PM literature by surveying 
books, conference papers and research papers from 1992 to 2007. Empirical realism pervades the 
body of project management knowledge and the project management profession. Zhang (2011) 
finds that the majority of project management literature characterizes project risk as objective 
rather than subjective, and he calls for a framework that integrates both schools of risk analysis. 
Hancock (2010) echoes this criticism by using King’s typopology of four problem types:  
Type I:    Known outcomes + fixed sequences = deterministic     
Types II: Known outcomes + known probabilities = statistical or stochastic    
Type III: Known outcomes + unknown probabilities = uncertainty  
Type IV: Unknown outcomes + debatable issues = emergence   
Most conventional project management literature and techniques assume Type I and Type II 
problems while only a small portion of literature (Loch, DeMeyer, Pich, 2006) deals with Type 
III and Type IV problems. Using Charles Perrow’s concept of ‘normal accidents,’ Hancock 
(2010) points out that type III and IV problems are the result of failures in complex, tightly 
coupled systems: The likelihood of disaster increases with a “higher degree of interactive 
complexity” and “ tighter coupling” between systems components (cited in Hancock, 2010, 
p.40). Human operator error often takes the blame for system failures but it is merely the 
“trigger” rather than the root cause (Hancock, 2010). While the traditional, linear risk 
management practices are adequate for conventional projects, today’s projects operate in 
increasingly complex system environments which require new education, processes and tools. In 
2008, Bredillet—the editor of PMI’s academic journal Project Management Journal—called for a 
new perspective and approach in project management research to meet the challenges of an 
unpredictable, discontinuous, unstable and nonlinear project environment: "I could argue that we 
are moving from an old paradigm—positivist—to a new one, or to a more balanced one, 
combining positivism, constructivism, and subjectivism, enabling us to address complexity, 
uncertainty, and ambiguity, because the old one is not working anymore.” (Bredillet, 2008, p.3) 
Project Management of the Second Order (PM-2, hereafter) is a new project management 
paradigm that, according to Saynisch (2010), addresses Bredillet’s call. As an extension of 
traditional project management, it advocates for an evolutionary, dynamic approach that uses 
simultaneously multiple techniques and tools to manage complex projects. Although the PM-2 
concept is still in a “draft state,” it won the IPMA Research Award 2007 and International Centre 
for Complex Project Management Research Prize 2010, and "will be the leading concept for the 
next decades" (Saynisch, 2010).  
This paper contributes to risk management knowledge of complex project environments by 
linking the PM-2 to the wicked problem framework and applying it to the case study of the 
Arctic offshore as an example of a complex project environment. It synthesizes different 
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strategies from the wicked problem framework to navigate wicked problems, including new 
variables to deconstruct traditional risk management processes, which leads to reducing biases 
and integrating both, objective and subjective, schools of risk analysis. Supporting this 
theoretical extension of risk management knowledge and practice is an empirical analysis at the 
macro level, does the Arctic offshore as a project environment fit the definition of a wicked 
problem? Then, at the micro level, how do various stakeholders perceive, define, and identify 
risk? The data come from 22 presentations in a risk seminar series that the University of Alaska 
North by 2020 Forum and the International Arctic Research Center, organized during the fall of 
2010 to spring of 2011. Scholars and practitioners from a range of disciplines discussed their 
definitions and assessments of risks in the context of offshore development projects in the Arctic.    
Wicked Problems in the Project Management Literature 
Wicked problems are problems that are unstructured, complex, irregular, interactive, adaptive 
and novel. They exist in any aspect of societal life—technological, cultural, economic, 
environmental, political, or legal—marked by complexity and interdependencies of stakeholders 
with differing views and values (Rittel & Weber, 1973). Wicked problems are found in different 
societal spheres, ranging from terrorism and AIDS to conflicts within project management teams 
over requirements, resources and competing interests. (The use of the terms—wicked problem 
and wicked projects—occur interchangeably in this paper employing Shurville and William’s 
(2005) definition of a wicked project as one displaying components of a wicked problem (cited 
in Finegan, 2010).  
While wicked problems are still widely unknown in the project management literature in the 
U.S., international project management communities have a young but rich history of using the 
wicked problem concept in its literature such as academic journals, working papers and 
conference presentations. In Australia, Pollack advocates for a project management paradigm 
shift by combining soft and hard approaches. Finegan (2010) and Checkland (2000) have 
developed soft system theories as research methods and applied them in a variety of wicked 
problem case studies, ranging from systems engineering to resource management to climate 
change and disaster recovery to Australian space industry. In the U.K., theorists such as 
Checkland (2000) and Pidd (2004) at the University of Lancaster have played the leading role in 
developing wicked problem theory. British scholars, Hancock and Holt (2003), applied the 
wicked problem concept to the risk management case study of the Heathrow’s Terminal Five, 
illustrating the flaws of risk management processes which focused primarily on technical, linear 
solutions and neglected behavioral and systems complexity. Hancock’s book (November, 2010) 
Tame, Messy and Wicked Risk Leadership is one of the first publications of wicked problems in 
project management. In the U.S, project management literature started recently to pay attention 
to wicked problems. For example, Whelton & Ballard (2002) focused on the effects on the 
definition phase and Jeff Conklin’s research (2008) addressed wicked problems in organizations 
and project teams. 
The wicked problem framework fits into the PM-2 reference model because both share elements 
from traditional project management, complexity theory, chaos theory, cybernetics, systems 
thinking theories and cognition theories. The concept of a wicked problem also underlies, as seen 
in Appendix A, Saynisch’s types of project complexity (2010): structural, technical, directional 
and temporal. Both concepts offer a systems view in dealing with complex projects which 
conventional, linear techniques do not provide.  
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Wicked Problem Characteristics Applied to the Arctic Offshore 
This paper applies three characteristics of wicked problems from the wicked problem literature 
through Rittel and Weber (1973) and Conklin (2006): (1) uniqueness, social and technical 
complexity; (2) changing requirements and constraints to solutions and (3) multiple stakeholders 
with different views and values—to show that identifying and managing risks in the Arctic 
offshore environment is a wicked problem. Within these three characteristics, we provide few 
examples to illustrate how they apply to the Arctic offshore project environment.  
Uniqueness, Technical and Social Complexity  
As onshore resources decrease and global warming change the landscape of multi-year sea ice, 
there have been efforts worldwide to explore the options of offshore oil development in the 
Arctic. Some Arctic countries such as the U.S. and Canada have plans for exploratory offshore 
drilling projects in the Arctic while other countries like Russia and Greenland move closer to 
implementing development drilling there. Some previous oil and gas projects are in some sense 
arctic, such as the Northstar project in Alaska, the Snøhvit project in Norway and Sakhalin I and 
II in Russia’s Far East. However, exploration and development in the Chukchi and Beaufort are 
unique with their own design challenges and solutions. It is thus novel and unique which is, 
according to Rittel & Weber (1973) and Conklin (2006), a characteristic of a wicked problem.  
Offshore Arctic projects have a high degree of technical and social complexity. Conventional or 
“tame” projects, according to Rittel and Weber (1973), can be “very technically complex,” but 
they have overall less systems interfaces, social and behavioral complexity and uncertainty than 
wicked problems (Conklin, 2006). Technically, the Arctic offshore project environment poses 
risks from an engineering and response and rescue perspective. Offshore structures need to 
withstand multiple year ice, strong winds and ocean currents. With accelerating climate change, 
it is not certain if materials and engineering specifications are sufficiently defined and designed. 
Designing and operating infrastructure in this extremely harsh and remote environment poses 
unique project risks, as reflected in Fisher’s (2006) risk analysis of oil and gas capital projects 
(OGP, hereafter) in Alaska. By comparing these risks to OGP in other parts of the U.S., Fisher’s 
survey of Alaskan project professionals concludes that Alaskan OGP are unique. This is 
particularly true for their External and Technical risk factors which constitute 91 percent of the 
all the identified risks in OGP in Alaska (p.49). Fisher’s analysis shows that OGP in Alaska is 
inherently complex and unique by nature; operating offshore projects in one of the most 
vulnerable, unique ecosystems in the world will add to this complexity.!The same finding is true 
for technical capabilities!of government and industry to respond and contain major oil spills 
adequately and quickly (see more detailed discussion later).  
The social-ecological impacts of Arctic offshore resource development on the fragile and unique 
Arctic ecosystem are unknown. Prince William Sound still hasn’t fully recovered from the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. A similar oil spill in the Arctic Ocean has potentially even more 
severe and long lasting ecological consequences.  In addition to the oil spill risks, preliminary 
studies show that industry noise affects the migration of whales (Richardson, 1999). Any impacts 
on the environment will have complex social effects on the local Iñupiat population and their 
ten-thousand-year-old subsistence culture. While Iñupiats own most of the threats to their local 
environment, they have relatively little to gain by offshore development in federal waters.  
Competing views and identities among Iñupiats increase the social complexity: while some 
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groups support offshore development, others oppose it (see the ‘Multiple Stakeholders with 
different views and values’ section for a more detailed discussion).  
Economic and energy security further increase the social complexity of this project environment. 
The State of Alaska depends on oil and gas exploration as it makes up 80 percent of its economy, 
collecting a total of $141 billion in taxes and royalties (Goldsmith, 2009, p.26). The state of 
Alaska already started an offshore oil production venture with BP through its North Star field 
which is connected to shore by a causeway. The world’s first offshore oil producing site in the 
Arctic is mostly located on state territory about 6 miles northwest of Prudhoe in the Beaufort 
Sea, and has produced oil since 2001 (Rosen, 2007). As oil production through the Trans Alaska 
Pipeline (TAPS) declines to 1/3 of its capacity and the existing policies continue, the State will 
keep encouraging the oil industry to explore and develop oil fields in the Arctic.  
The Federal government, as the biggest national owner of Arctic waters, also balances 
conflicting missions: the stewardship of marine resources, mineral leasing and revenues, the 
special legal relationship with indigenous peoples, maritime navigation and safety, and energy 
and national security. In the Arctic Region Policy, the Obama administration states its 
contradictory policy that the United States has "broad and fundamental national security interests 
in the Arctic region," including “boundary issues, scientific research, transportation, energy and 
environmental protection” (Lundestad, 2009). The federal agency of the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE, former MMS) is at the forefront of 
negotiating these federal policies. From 2005 until 2008, BOEMRE had revenues of $2.75billion 
through leases in the Chukchi and Beaufort Sea, including Shell’s Chukchi lease of $2.1billion 
(Joling, 2011). Geo-politically, countries like Russia have made territorial claims to the Arctic, 
putting pressure on other Arctic and non-Arctic countries to substantiate any claims in the 
contested area of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS, hereafter). Seven Arctic countries (U.S. 
Canada, Norway, Russia, Greenland, Sweden and Norway) and non-Arctic Countries represent 
different stakeholders whose interests often conflict .The Law of the Sea—which the U.S. has 
not yet ratified—is currently the only international applicable policy, and legitimizes territorial 
claims based on a country’s portion of its continental shelf. According to the USGS report 
(2008), the Arctic has a total of 90 billion barrels of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil (13 
percent share world-wide), 1,670 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas (30 
percent share world-wide), and 44 billion barrels of technically recoverable natural gas liquids 
(20 percent share world-wide) in 25 geologically defined areas located north of the Arctic Circle. 
Eighty four percent of these resources are offshore (USGS, 2008). These shares are between 20.5 
percent and 27.6 percent of the total global resources which the industry perceives as the “last 
frontier of substantial resources” (SDWG report on Arctic Energy, 2009, p.7). In addition to 
hydrocarbon resources, other globally important resources such as marine mammals, shipping 
rights, renewable energy, fishing, tourism and water reserves also create conflicts between 
national and international stakeholders.  
Changing Requirements and Constraints to Solutions 
The Arctic is at the forefront of global climate change which occurs there at an accelerated pace. 
Jane Lubchenco, Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and Administrator, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) put it succinctly “No single region 
better exemplifies the complex interdependence of communities and changing ecosystem 
conditions than the Arctic” (Leggiere, 2011). Environmental changes affect requirements for 
scientific research, regulation, engineering, operations and emergency response.  
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Due to insufficient baseline and monitoring data, limited understanding of system dynamics, and 
correspondingly unreliable forecasting models, it is difficult to predict the rate of climate change 
and its consequences on the marine environment. For example, baseline data for seismic activity, 
ice loads and currents are available for certain parts of the Arctic Ocean, but they are not always 
conclusive, complete and accessible. The Arctic Ocean Research and Science Policy Review Act 
of 2009 requires agencies to collect scientific baseline data in the Arctic (Metzger, 2010), but it 
will depend on Congress’s willingness to approve funds to address these science gaps. The 
current preparedness level of the Coast Guard, as the first responder in Arctic emergencies, also 
illustrates new requirements for safe Arctic operations. A recent government report to congress 
indicates that the Coast Guard “doesn’t currently have Arctic maritime domain awareness – a full 
understanding of variables that could affect the security, safety, economy and environment in the 
Arctic” (GAO, 10-870, 2010). One important factor is the lack of Coast Guard infrastructure in 
the Arctic. The nearest Coast Guard base is located 1000 miles away on Kodiak Island; the 
“tyranny of distance” in Alaska limits the Coast Guard’s ability to engage in effective oil spill 
prevention, containment and cleanup (Montoya, 2010). The Coast Guard currently has three 
icebreakers of which only one is operational, limiting its Arctic response capabilities (Witness 
the Arctic, 2011).  
As Arctic ice cover decreases, there might be less need for icebreakers in the long-term and 
higher demand for commercial ship models. For example, Hyundai Heavy Industries just 
completed testing of a new ice-breaking iron ore carrier, the 190,000 DWT, at the Institute for 
Ocean Technology in Canada (MarineLink, 2011). If these requirements are safe for Arctic 
operations, new sailing routes could cut the distance between Europe and Asia by 40 percent and 
with that, transportation cost and emissions. A higher level of Arctic activities through vessel 
traffic and drilling operations require the need for consistent regulation standards and safety and 
rescue infrastructure across the Arctic countries. Limited political support to fund research, to 
build capacities of agencies such as the Coast Guard and of Arctic infrastructure are constraints 
to solutions of operating safely in the Arctic, which is another aspect of the wicked problem 
(Conklin and Weill, cited in Pidd, 2004, p.203).     
Multiple Stakeholders with different views and values  
Project stakeholders in the Arctic have conflicting views and values about the risks of resource 
development. Internationally, some Arctic countries such as Russia “embrace” offshore 
development while others such as Norway take a more careful approach. In 2008, Russia passed 
a law that permits the “transfer offshore blocks to state-controlled oil companies in a no-bid 
process that does not involve detailed environmental reviews” (Kramer and Kraus, 2011). In 
August 2011, Rosneft and Exxon Mobil signed a deal for offshore drilling in the Kara Sea. Many 
Russians perceive this place as “icy dump” because of nuclear waste disposal from nuclear 
submarines and testing (Kramer and Kraus, 2011). In contrast, Norway recently rejected drilling 
around the Lofoten and Vesteraalen islands off northern Norway which is an important spawning 
ground for cod (Amland, 2011). Canada’s discourse about drilling safety in the Arctic offshore 
shows conflicting views between regulators and industry. While regulators and environmental 
groups favor ‘expensive’ relief wells as a mandatory requirement, the industry rejects the idea 
and focuses on improving technology to prevent and stop blowouts (McCarthy, 2011).  
Regulatory systems among major Arctic countries, as Baker’s research (2011) shows, differ 
substantially. While some countries favor prescription-based regulation (i.e. USA) others rely on 
performance-based regulation (i.e. Norway, UK), resulting in varying environmental and 
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response planning standards. Another regulatory issue is that the existing guidelines by the 
Arctic Council are “non-binding” and lack their own wording, but heavily rely on the UN 
Declarations such as the FPIC (Free Prior Informed Consent) principles for indigenous rights 
(Baker, 2011).   
The position of Alaska’s North Slope Borough Mayor Itta shows that stakeholder opinions also 
vary at a regional level and over time: In 2007, Mayor Itta opposed offshore development, 
stating that “It’s a way of life against an opposing value. This way of life has value; nobody can 
put it in dollars and cents (Mouawad, 2007).” In fall 2010, he declined to legally challenge 
Shell’s recently approved permits for offshore exploration in the Beaufort Sea. The North Slope 
Borough and the Arctic Slope Regional Corp (ASRC) now support offshore development with 
best practice environmental protection by arguing that modern Native identity depends on 
economic development through resource extraction (Itta, 2011; Glenn, 2011). In contrast, the 
Native Village of Point Hope, the Inupiat community of the Arctic Slope, community leaders in 
Nuiqsut (Napageak, 2011) and tribal-environmental groups like Resisting Environmental 
Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) oppose offshore development because of the risks 
to the environment and subsistence culture (Burke, 2010).  
Stakeholders also differ in evaluating the capacity to clean-up major oil spills in the Arctic. Shell 
claims "We already took into account worst-case discharge when we built a world-class Arctic 
oil spill response fleet for Alaska, so it's hard to imagine raising the bar even higher than we 
already have in that arena" (Joling, 2011). Leah Donahey of the Alaska Wilderness League refers 
to a spill study in Norwegian Arctic, showing that “There is no known way to clean up a spill in 
the Arctic's icy, extreme conditions" (Joling, 2011). Although discussing the same topic, both 
stakeholders have completely opposing views and perception of the risk and capability to clean-
up a major oil spill. Discussion at the seminar questioned whether cleanup crews would be even 
deployed under hazardous weather conditions.  
This macro-structural analysis of this case study shows that resource development in the Arctic 
offshore is a wicked project environment because it is unique and socially and technically 
complex; has changing requirements and constraints to solutions; and involves multiple 
stakeholders with different views and values. The next section examines risk complexity at the 
micro level to explain why and how stakeholders perceive these risks differently.  
 
 
Analysis: Risk Complexity at the Micro-Level 
 
Research Methods and Approach to Analysis 
Content analysis is the methodology of choice; Appendix B shows the research protocol used for 
analyzing the presentation data from the seminar series “Defining Risk in Arctic Coastal and 
Offshore Resource Development: Perspectives and International Standards” that was organized 
by the University of Alaska North by 2020 Forum during the fall of 2010 to spring of 2011. This 
qualitative, non-statistical social science research method analyzes different types of 
communication. (Presentation data including video and Power Point slides are available on a 
website North by 2020: Defining Risk in Arctic Coastal and Offshore Resource Development: 
Perspectives and International Standards). Appendix C shows the seminar schedule with 
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presenter, date and title of the presentation.) After attending the presentations and reviewing the 
video recordings, we coded the presentations—according to the research protocol in Appendix 
D—to analyze the descriptive data. Additional information came from post-presentation Q&A 
sessions and the organizations’ webpages.  
The Risk Seminar Series 
The risk seminar series is a North by 2020 project which is part of the International Polar Year 
initiative that aims to increase understanding of Polar Regions globally. The risk seminar’s 
primary goal was to identify some of the major institutional players from the private, public and 
governmental sector of the Arctic offshore project environment and to learn about their 
perceptions of risks. Figure 1 illustrates the broad scope of the seminar series. 
 Figure 1: Overview of Risk Seminar Series, Fall 2010 to Spring 2011 
 
 !
 
Twenty two presentations introduced some of the key stakeholders of Arctic offshore projects 
and explored different types of project risks which affect Arctic safety, ranging from oil and gas 
projects to Arctic vessel traffic to disaster management projects, both to human-caused and 
natural disasters (i.e. geophysical hazards and hurricanes), to human error in the decision-making 
process. The seminar series focused on risk perspectives of, regulatory agencies, oil companies, 
consultants, local governments, environmental NGOs, and academics. Each stakeholder’s risk 
context depended on the project type and organizational mission. The sample is not random, and 
while it is intentionally diverse, it does not represent all key stakeholders of Arctic Offshore 
projects. 
Research Variables   
The application of three research variables—risk paradigms, risk attitudes, and data sources—
explains how and why risk perceptions vary among different stakeholders and project types. 
 
Academic (6) 
 
Government (7) 
 
International 
Standards (4) 
 
Industry (3) 
 
NGOs (2) 
Types (Frequency)   
Academic: !
hurricane forecasting  (1) 
shipping (2) 
economic (1)  
organizational management (HRO) (1) 
risk culture  (1)  
social psychology (1)   
Industry:    
oil companies (2)  
consultants (1) 
Government:          
local (1)  
state (4)  
federal (2) 
International Standards:!!!!
Engineering – ISO 19906 (2)  
geophysical (1)    
Nongovernmental organizations:  
environmental (2)         
!
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While most research focuses on distinguishing between objective and subjective risk analysis, 
the use of these variables applies to both schools of risk analysis and deconstructs the risk 
analysis process. Utilizing these variables helps project managers to negotiate complex project 
environments with diverse stakeholder groups and is a first step to reconcile both schools of risk 
analysis.  
Risk Paradigms  
We identified five categories of risk paradigms: probabilistic-deterministic, traditional risk 
assessment, holistic, precautionary and cognitive psychology of decision-making (CPoDM, 
hereafter). Although the use of these terms is common, they are unique in this context. Although 
each risk paradigm conceptualizes risk differently, presentations displayed a wide spectrum of 
characteristics from different risk paradigms. This resulted in the possibility of presentations 
belonging to more than one category.  In such cases we identified the presentation according to 
the paradigm most prominent within the presentation. For each paradigm, we provide a short 
overview, offer examples from the presentations and assess its robustness to deal with systems 
complexity and biases.    
Probabilistic-Deterministic Perspective   
The probabilistic-deterministic risk paradigm describes risk from a technical engineering 
perspective. Examples from the seminar series were Walt Spring’s and Andrew Metzger’s 
presentations about the ISO 19906 standard. This international design standard provides 
engineering design parameters for oil and gas offshore structures which are located in waters of 
varying ice cover due to seasonal changes (Spring, 2010). Legally, the ISO 19906 standard is not 
enforceable and each country decides about its own implementation. It only requires engineers to 
develop their own designs within the given parameters of the normative. While Walt Spring’s 
presentation focuses on the development of the normative, Andrew Metzger’s describes its 
philosophy. This means that structures are engineered in such a way to withstand certain stresses 
of actions (i.e. ice, waves, currents, wind).   
The robustness of an engineered system is based on the reliability principle. That is the capacity 
of the system has to be larger than the demand on the systems. If both of these variables are 
known, the problem is deterministic and no risk exists. If the variables are unknown, it is a non-
deterministic problem that has increased uncertainty in its engineering design. The distance 
between these two reliability values—the resistance factor phi and the load factor gamma—
within their statistical distributions determines the degree of uncertainty in the engineering 
design. As the distance between the two means increases, reliability increases and uncertainty 
decreases for a certain design (Metzger, 2010). Although this methodology is based on a sound 
process involving mathematical, statistical models and reliability theory, engineers determine the 
reliability values and their distance to each other according to their organization’s needs and 
desired level of reliability. To control for these uncertainties, engineers usually “over-design” the 
structure through a “robust” design and use materials which exceed specifications. These 
considerations, however, put economic strains on project costs and stakeholder organizations 
investing in these projects. Organizational culture and cognitive biases play a significant role in 
making these design and oversight decisions.  
In a recent article “Why risk analysis fails,” Douglas A. Samuelson (2011) points out eight 
common mistakes in risk analysis. In this context, we apply three of these which are appropriate 
for analyzing the probabilistic-deterministic risk paradigm critically: The first mistake is “unduly 
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limiting assumptions in the analyses” which pertains to applying the same models, variables and 
values in different project environment; for example, BP used the same drilling procedure and 
risk assessment to operate in unprecedented water depth for its Deepwater Horizon well. 
Samuelson says that the relationships between variables change and “uncorrelated behaviors 
become correlated.” Also, global warming may change calculations and relationships between 
‘actions’ variables (i.e. ice, currents, wind) affecting the offshore structures. A second mistake is, 
according to Samuelson, insufficient attention to availability and quality of data. A robust 
statistical sample is required to calculate important variables such as ice actions. While some 
scientific data exists for some points in the Arctic, comprehensive data is lacking. In addition, 
there isn’t sufficient baseline data to determine the rate of environmental change and its effects 
on the design reliability during a product’s lifecycle. Forecasting models are imperfect and 
demand more data during its development process. Samuelson points out that modelers often 
choose not to collect more data but to use already existing, easily accessible data. As experienced 
engineers start to retire, transferring their knowledge base to the next generation of engineers 
will be crucial to make safe decisions in uncertain project environments.  
Traditional Risk Assessment 
The traditional risk assessment is a managerial approach that is process and expert centered and 
uses qualitative and quantitative tools. This risk paradigm perceives risk as something 
identifiable and manageable. The majority of presentations in the seminar series used this risk 
paradigm across different project environments and organizations such as maritime traffic (MRA 
- Aleutian), disaster management (MRA – USCG and Hurricane Risk Methodology), oil and gas 
infrastructure (IRA – SOA), regulatory agencies (BOEMRE, ADNR), and internal risk 
management processes of companies (Shell, Conoco Phillips). 
PMBOK Guide (2008) includes risk management processes which reflect this paradigm; they are 
used to determine project risks and their effects on project objectives such as costs, schedule and 
scope.  A “good” process is, according to Hancock, the “dominant control mechanism” that 
provides an impression of control (2010, p.5). The premise of the traditional risk identification 
and assessment process is that data gaps can be filled by using an iterative process to collect 
“High-Quality Information” such as historic records, interviews, experts, and workshops 
(Practice Standard for Project Risk Management, 2009). In contrast, Hancock argues that a lack 
of information is only one reason for uncertainty, but behavioral, social, interactive complexities 
also cause uncertainty.  
Another common characteristic of this paradigm is assessing known risk by multiplying the 
probability of the risk occurring with the severity of this risk on project objectives. According to 
Hancock (2010), rules of probability do not capture the “reality of risk” (p. 41) and imply the 
“illusion of control and understanding […] and enables organizations to devise risk registers that 
quantify risks in terms of figures, adding credence and authority” (p.5). This probability model 
may also encourage identifying unknown risks as if they were known risks to make them more 
“manageable.” Although PMI’s Practice Standard for Project Risk Management (2009) 
acknowledges the existence of “unknown” risks, it advises not to “waste” resources on 
unmanageable risks (p.32). This is one of the reasons why traditional risk assessment has an 
“abysmal record” of predicting rare, high impact—Black Swans—events (Taleb, Goldstein and 
Spitznagel, 2009). Another critique is that the calculation is linear in probabilities and outcomes, 
whereas human risk preferences are decidedly nonlinear. Humans tend to be more risk averse for 
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low probability but high impact adverse outcomes. On the other end, many people are risk 
seeking for low probability but high impact beneficial outcomes, like lotteries (see further 
discussion under Risk Attitudes)    
Samuelson (2011) cites “insufficient empiricism about assessing quantitative methods” as a 
common mistake in risk assessment. Samuelson cautions using single measurement variables 
such as confidence intervals and standard deviation to assess risks and their impacts on projects. 
Research studies show that experts often struggle with their computations and these 
measurement variables do not account for all sources and excesses of variation as they exist in 
the real world (Hubbard, 2009, cited in Samuelson, 2009). Some critics even argue against using 
standard deviations in risk management (Taleb, Goldstein and Spitznagel (2009). This means, 
Samuelson (2011) says, that popular techniques such as Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) have 
limited utility; they “increase comfort far more than they improve actual results.” When 
assessing risks, risk team management members need to be aware of the elusiveness of risks and 
use risk assessment tools cautiously.   
Holistic Perspective   
The holistic risk paradigm employs a systems approach to risk, which takes a broader and more 
inclusive view to risk. It includes multiple disciplines and puts more emphasis on integrating 
traditional indigenous knowledge. Classical examples from the risk seminar series were 
associated with two presentations of the Arctic Council—International!Arctic EPPR Standards 
and Arctic Maritime Risk Assessment— which reflect the policies and missions of this 
intergovernmental body and its working groups. Each working group of the Arctic Council 
consists primarily of technical experts, but the Arctic Council’s founding mission, as stated in the 
Ottawa Declaration of 1996, requires working groups to incorporate traditional indigenous 
knowledge (Arctic Council, 1996). In addition, the Arctic Council’s projects and their research 
scopes are complex, and require working across different working groups, stakeholders and 
disciplines. For example, International Arctic EPPR Standards uses a multi-disciplinary approach 
to identify emergency prevention, preparedness and response activities for different types of 
emergencies, whether human-induced or nature-induced.  We also lumped in a group of 
academic studies such as Selkregg’s presentation about risk culture or Roberts’ research about 
High Reliability Organizations because they address dimensions of risk assessment which are 
unaddressed in the traditional risk paradigm. Another example of a holistic risk paradigm is the 
State agency’s Geological and Geophysical Survey; its organizational mission is to address 
Alaskan coastal communities’ geophysical risks by which 84 percent of these villages face the 
risk of flooding and erosion (Wolken, 2010). Traditional indigenous knowledge provides 
“anecdotal” information and supplements scientific geophysical data from baseline studies, 
mapping and fieldwork studies (Wolken, 2010; Eicken 2011). Although the holistic risk 
paradigm can include elements from other risk paradigms, it facilitates more than the other 
paradigms a project environment that sees risk identification and assessment from a systems 
view and fosters collective knowledge from different disciplines and cultures.  
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Precautionary Perspective 
Environmental law differentiates between the precautionary approach and precautionary 
principle. This paper focuses on the precautionary risk paradigm as conveyed in the combination 
of these two quotes by British mathematician Peter Saunder and the Wingspread Statement:   
“[I]f one is embarking on something new, one should think very carefully about 
whether it is safe or not [for human health and the environment], … [even if some 
cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically] and should 
not go ahead until reasonably convinced it is.” (cited in Bell, 2009, p.232) 
The precautionary risk paradigm opposes traditional risk assessment, arguing that it is not 
possible to fully understand and manage risk. The precautionary risk paradigm is in essence risk 
averse by which no risk is tolerated if there is a chance of significant harm. In the risk seminar 
series, examples of this paradigm were environmental NGOs such as Pacific Environment and 
local government perspectives. Holley (2010) used two opposing questions to explain the 
precautionary perspective: The traditional risk assessment asks “How much harm is allowable” 
while the precautionary perspective states “How little harm is possible.” Its premise is that all 
projects are harmful and people make mistakes (Holley, 2010). The precautionary perspective 
also takes a critical view of the probabilistic-deterministic one by challenging the reliability of 
these engineering structures and the ability of the oil and gas industry and regulatory state and 
federal agencies to control the risks. The local North Slope Borough government, as another 
presentation, also identifies with the precautionary perspective but with a much ‘milder form.’ 
The NSB favors “Best Management Technology” (BMT) and “Best Management Practices” 
(BMP) which invites biases as to who determines this selection and how is “best” defined. 
Holley, in contrast, defines the precautionary principle in its most conservative form, appealing 
to moral and ethical standards to see it as “duty to take action to prevent harm” (Holley, 2010).  
As an environmental NGO, the precautionary approach is part of its organizational culture of 
environmental conservation. However, the presentation by Henry Huntington from the Pew 
Environment Group shows that environmental NGOs may vary within the conservation 
approach: The Pew Environment Group contributes to the “conversation” about offshore 
resource development by communicating its research results. Pew accepts the fact that a zero risk 
approach to offshore development is not realistic, and advocates for “raising the bar to the 
highest possible standards” and a more realistic practices of response strategies to oil spills such 
as controlled oil spills in Norway (Huntington, 2011).    
 
Cognitive Psychology of Decision Making (CPoDM)   
Project Management literature has focused on systematic biases in decision-making such as 
group think, overconfidence, sunk cost, organizational and project culture (Shore, 2008) while 
cognitive biases have been neglected. Biases represent common distortions in the human 
decision-making process, and “reflect a particular point of view that may be contrary to rational 
thought” (Shore, 2008, p.7). The cognitive psychology of decision-making (CPoDM) examines 
cognitive biases and their effects on risk perception in decision-making. Weber (2010) provides a 
succinct overview of the insights from psychological research on how humans perceive risk and 
how it affects decision making. She explains the common differences between expert and public 
perceptions of risk in terms of risk as an “objective” construct versus risk as a feeling. 
Perceptions of risk are affected by familiarity: unfamiliarity engenders fear (risk is 
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overestimated), while familiarity engenders complacency (risk is underestimated).  Perceptions 
are affected by the perceived degree of individual control (e.g. driving a car versus flying in an 
airplane); the salience of recent events (e.g. Deepwater Horizon spill); by beliefs, expectation, 
values and culture; by unrelated issues competing for our limited capacity for attention; and by 
context cues, such as the social setting or the words used to describe the possible outcomes. 
There are also framing effects that weight gains differently than losses relative to some perceived 
status quo. Tolerance for risk tends to vary by age, gender, and affluence. Furthermore, 
individuals’ risk taking and perception vary across different domains, physical, financial, moral, 
social or recreational.  For example, they may be risk averse in recreational situations while 
seeking risks in business situations (Blais and Weber, 2006). Positive or negative experiences 
can change these perceptions. Therefore, decision-making under uncertainty is not a static and 
consistent concept but is rather fluid: emotions and cognitive evaluation affect how an individual 
or group perceives risks at a certain time, situation and place.  
 
In her research about High Reliability Organizations (HRO, hereafter), Karlene Roberts (2010) 
uses the CPoDM framework with organizational theory to identify risk perception—what 
knowledge exists and to what extent it is acknowledged and mitigated—as one of five 
components organizations must possess to be considered highly reliable. The other four 
components are process auditing, reward system, quality degradation and command and control. 
From studying other high risk project environments such as the nuclear power industry, the 
chemical industry and naval carriers, Roberts points out the significance of repetitive safety 
training procedures in management and operations. The reward system encourages low power 
agents to actively participate in identifying and communicating risks. Applying the CPoDM 
framework contributes to deconstruct risk management processes, to create awareness of biases 
and to counteract complacency within project teams and organizations.   
 
Primary Data for Risk Identification  
Figure 2 shows the presentations grouped by risk paradigms (except the Cognitive Psychology of 
Decision Making) and primary data sources they use to identify risks. (Appendix E shows the 
detailed analysis, illustrating what data sources are utilized by different stakeholders.) Shading 
shows to what degree stakeholders utilize various data sources: dark means high use, light means 
low use, while white means no use at all.  
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Figure 2: Primary Data Sources for Risk Identification Process by Risk Paradigm 
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Across all the risk paradigms, quantitative data in the form of geophysical, metocean and 
technical data and expert judgment are the most frequently used data source. However, the risk 
seminar series features a variety of qualitative data, ranging from expert judgment to specific 
social science research methods, which as a data category make up most of the data being 
utilized in the risk seminar series. Systems modeling can include quantitative and qualitative 
aspects depending on the type of model such as maps and forecasting models, and represent a 
simulation of the real world. 
While some paradigms utilize a wide range of different data sources, others use only few. The 
probabilistic-deterministic employs more quantitative data while other types of data are either 
not utilized or not mentioned in these presentations. The traditional risk assessment paradigm 
uses six out of the seven types of data to identify risks, including qualitative data such as Expert 
judgment, Lessons Learned and complementary approaches. The holistic risk paradigm and 
precautionary principle use most of their data from qualitative and complementary data sources, 
and utilize all of the seven data types available. 
 
Each risk paradigm uses quantitative data to identify risks but differs in their variety of data 
sources: The traditional risk assessment and the holistic risk paradigm have the most significant 
range of data sources and use more local knowledge than the other paradigms. The holistic and 
precautionary risk paradigms emphasize a wider range of stakeholder involvement, including 
local knowledge and public testimony.  
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Risk Attitude  
The last research variable of this micro-analysis is risk attitude; the PMI’s Practice Standard for 
Project Risk Management (2009) defines it as a “chosen mental disposition towards uncertainty, 
adopted explicitly or implicitly by individuals and groups, driven by perception and evidenced 
by observable behavior” (p.111). Although risk attitudes can occur on a continuous scale, PMI 
identifies four main categories as illustrated in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Risk Attitude Spectrum (from Hillson D. A. & Murray-Webster R., 2007) 
 
 
• Risk-averse stakeholders are not comfortable with risks and are willing to avoid the risks. 
Examples from the seminar series are the North Slope Borough as local government, the 
Coast Guard as the incident commander and environmental NGOs.  
• Risk-tolerant stakeholders are indifferent about risks. The majority of presentations had a 
tolerant risk attitude, including presentations from state agencies, the Arctic Council and 
academic entities.  There is also a political interest from a government agency perspective 
to frame their risk position as neutral rather than tolerant or seeking. Organizations’ risk 
attitude reflects also its mission and organizational culture. For example, State agencies 
that conduct risk assessments to protect public and environmental well-being balance this 
against other objectives such as State’s revenues, employment or costs of moving villages 
away from coastal areas.  
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• Risk-neutral stakeholders manage risks based on their expected value. Two presentations 
reflecting this risk attitude come from the engineering-industry perspective. The 
engineering design process gives a sense of control and familiarity with the risk of design 
failure. Spring's presentation also reflects corporate interests of Shell, which potentially 
has the most to gain from Arctic oil development. Another presentation describes the 
economic risks of not developing resources in the Arctic offshore (Goldsmith, 2011). 
• Risk-seeking stakeholders see risks as challenges and feel excited dealing with them. 
There weren’t any stakeholders who had a risk seeking attitude.  
Appendix F lists each presentation with its corresponding risk category.   
Psychology research confirms this distribution of risk attitudes: People tend to experience level 
of discomfort to risks by being risk averse rather than being comfortable to risks and being risk 
seeking. In addition, there is a correlation of stakeholder’s risk attitude and whether stakeholders 
will benefit or loose from risks. Those who have little to gain and are directly impacted by 
negative risks tend to be risk averse while those who potentially gain from it, tend to be more 
risk neutral or tolerant. As familiarity levels with project risks changes during the project, 
stakeholders may adopt a different risk attitude at different phases of the project. 
 
Summary of Wicked Problem Discourse Analysis in the Arctic offshore  
The foregoing analysis consists of two main sections. With the premise that existing linear risk 
management processes are inadequate to address complex project environments, the first section 
defined a wicked problem and applied three characteristics of a wicked problem. Arctic offshore 
is a wicked project environment because it is unique, socially and technically complex, has 
changing requirements and constraints to solutions and involves multiple stakeholders who have 
different views and values about project risks related to resource development. According to 
Conklin, there is “neither right nor wrong" when dealing with wicked problems, because 
different perspectives represent "independent values and goals" from their ideological or cultural 
point of reference (Conklin, page 7). 
 
Examining risk complexity at the micro level through a unique set of presentation data explains 
the reasons why stakeholders perceive and define risks differently: each stakeholder group 
employs a distinct combination of risk paradigm, risk attitude and data for risk identification 
which individuals -- based on project type, disciplinary conventions and individual cognitive 
biases -- use and interpret differently. Some stakeholders defined risk as something identifiable 
and manageable through risk management processes and tools as illustrated by the traditional 
risk assessment approach, others defined risk as a social construct and feeling which perceives 
risk as less tangible and not manageable. Each risk paradigm used a distinct set of data sources 
depending on the project and its purpose. The holistic risk paradigm utilized, though to varying 
degree, most of the available data sources available and put most emphasis on involving diverse 
groups of stakeholders and local knowledge. The majority of presentations used a neutral risk 
attitude while others were risk averse or risk tolerant. Risk attitude depends on various factors 
such as organizational culture, proximity to risks and potential outcome for the stakeholder, from 
either positive or negative risks.  
How can risk managers navigate wicked problems? 
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Strategies for Navigating Wicked Problems  
Risk managers have several emerging tools and theories to tackle wicked problems. Some are 
under development in project management theory and practice, while others are rooted in other 
fields of social science and professional practice. The risk identification phase is most critical. 
The risk manager must identify the problem as wicked, not tame, and recognize the shortcomings 
of traditional, linear risk management techniques. Figure 4 synthesizes different wicked problem 
literature: it conceptually shows the difference between wicked and tame problems in terms of 
their dimensions and degrees of complexity (Rittel and Weber, 1973; Conklin, 2010).  
Figure 4. Wicked versus Tame Complexity 
 
Synthesizing some of the literature and our research findings, here are some strategies of the 
wicked problem framework: 
Systems thinking theories are tools to identify and understand different aspects of wicked 
problems (Checkland & Winter, 2003). Andrew Finegan (2010) recommends a multi-technique 
approach of different system thinking theories—Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) and System 
Dynamics Modelling (SDM) and Grounded Theory (GT)—because each technique has its own 
strengths to understand the wicked problem. Appendix G describes each theory in detail. 
After identifying that the problem is wicked, a participatory, deliberative process, such as a risk 
workshop, can facilitate diverse stakeholder representation to assess and mitigate risks 
collectively.  This participatory, deliberative process relies on four key principles:   
Integrate collective intelligence. Complex problems are beyond the scope of knowledge of any 
one individual or group. Therefore, decision-making situations must employ collective 
intelligence to transfer, receive and integrate knowledge about wicked problem complexities 
(Weber and Khademian, 2008). Diverse representation integrates and harnesses collective 
intelligence. Research indicates that for complex problems, utilizing collective intelligence leads 
to better decisions over the long run. If stakeholders with a range of different risk paradigms are 
at the table, the risk analysis would be more complete, democratic and effective.  
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Employ local knowledge. Local stakeholders have unique knowledge, vantage point, 
observations, interests and perspectives. The risk management process should fully engage local 
stakeholders and utilize the resources they bring to the table.  
Distribution of risks and benefits. Risks and benefits are not evenly distributed in space, time, or 
social landscape. Stakeholders who bear a disproportionate share of the adverse risks need to be 
engaged and represented in the risk management process. This is not only a question of 
environmental justice, but of managing political risk, decreasing the likelihood of legal, political 
or extra-legal opposition. At-risk stakeholders are likely to promote and improve strategies for 
risk reduction, impact mitigation and response, as well as strategies for sharing benefits to 
promote buy-in.  
Equitable solutions. Recent scholarship on the politics of ecosystem management demonstrates 
the benefits of participatory and deliberative methods of decision-making for finding equitable 
solutions to conflicts over natural resources. Theories of participatory and deliberative 
democracy suggest that the trust and “buy-in” that are the foundation of institutional 
sustainability can be best achieved when decision-making processes account for the individual 
calculations of interest of stakeholders and where shared values are developed within flexible 
arrangements for making and implementing policies (Ager, et al, 2005; Lipschutz 1996; Janicke 
1996).  Discussion on design principles for effective participation can be found at Haley et al. 
(2011). 
How can risk managers implement this participatory, deliberative process to approach wicked 
problems more effectively? Risk leadership competency will encourage risk managers to use an 
adaptive management approach, and problem-structuring tools aid in the conduct of multi-
stakeholder processes to conceptualize risk.   
Risk Leadership competency. Hancock’s concept of risk leadership (2010) is the management 
competency that risk managers need in order to approach wicked problems. In contrast to 
traditional process-based risk management, it encourages risk practitioners to take a “reflective, 
situational approach to project management” by acknowledging and even, embracing risk 
management’s imperfect, dynamic and complex nature (Hancock, p.86). Appendix H compares 
risk leadership to regular risk management characteristics. Risk leadership emphasizes a 
behavioral approach in risk management by taking into account different beliefs, risk 
perceptions, motivations and needs. According to risk leadership, the risk process adapts to 
overcome other project risks such as politics, bureaucracy and resources and to facilitate 
“satisfactory” solutions for the “common good” rather than optimal solutions for few 
stakeholders (Hancock, 2010). This concept of risk leadership is congruent with the literature on 
adaptive management. For application to the Arctic offshore project environment, see Rosenberg 
and Powell (2011) and Hazlett (2011).  
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Problem Structuring Tools. Risk managers can use problem-structuring tools such as Mind 
maps/ Rich picture, risk variables (i.e. paradigms, data sources and risk attitudes) and their 
definitions to assist stakeholders with conceptualizing the problem collectively.   
• Mind-Maps/Rich Pictures are graphic models of “the insights of people” that “make them 
accessible to others” (Pidd, p.6). Rich Picture from Checkland’s soft system methodology 
(SSM) is the most common application, but there are other models. For example, Conklin’s 
Dialog Mapping is an iteration of Rittel and Weber’s issue-based information system (IBIS) 
that focuses on recording group decisions while Eden and Ackermann’s cognitive mapping 
model assists individuals and groups in strategic situations (cited in Pidd, 2004).  
• Variables and their Definitions: Stakeholders can use risk variables —risk paradigms, data 
sources and risk attitudes—to deconstruct existing risk management processes and mitigate 
their own and other stakeholders’ biases. Ideally, stakeholders are aware of their own and 
other stakeholders’ risk paradigms, of the biases from data sources and invite perspectives 
from other paradigms to aim for a complementary approach.  In addition, the classical SSM 
approach, the CATWOE analysis, can stakeholders’ definitions of Customer, Actors, 
Transformation process, World view or perspective, Owners and Environmental forces. 
Clarifying definitions of these concepts contributes to common understanding among 
stakeholders about the problem and each other’s perceptions.   
Why should risk managers and upper management support this wicked problem framework as a 
methodology to approach risks in complex projects? Key benefits include mitigating biases, 
conflict reduction and building trust and relationships.   
Mitigate bias. Traditional risk management, grounded in the linear, reductionist paradigm, brings 
that particular bias to the conceptualization of risk.  If the project or risk management team 
consists of primarily experts from the same organization or industry perspective and with a 
similar familiarity level, the risk assessment is more homogenous and biased. The wicked 
problem framework creates awareness of cognitive biases among team members and experts and 
encourages participation from team members and stakeholders who have diverse backgrounds 
(i.e. experience level, functional areas, organizations and industries). Although PMBOK Guide 
(2008) calls for a broad stakeholder input and quality data to mitigate cognitive and motivational 
biases, concrete steps on what and how to facilitate this process are lacking. Elke Weber’s 
research (2011) offers insights about creating an effective group setting, such as a risk workshop 
or extended stakeholder dialog, to promote convergence in risk perceptions, favour collective 
over individual goals and concerns, and foster a longer time horizon.  
Conflict reduction. Conflicts among stakeholder groups are ubiquitous. When addressed early, 
disagreements can be valuable catalysts to creative solutions that are supported by the group, 
particularly if there is active communication and a shared interest in problem-solving. The end 
result can be greater support for, and therefore more durable, solutions and their implementation. 
In multi-party processes, the design of the process can determine how conflict is prevented as 
well as addressed when it emerges. The field of collaboration and conflict resolution offers 
several principles for effectively engaging parties in a process: see the 2005 OMB-CEQ 
memorandum to federal agencies engaging in collaborative problem solving and environmental 
conflict resolution, and from draft principles the US Institute developed for stakeholder 
engagement in marine spatial planning.  (Palmer, 2011 
http://www.iarc.uaf.edu/en/NX2020/SI/program/panel2-palmer) 
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Relationships and trust. Face-to-face dialog over time builds cross-stakeholder relationships, 
understanding and trust. Communication and trust is prerequisite to collaborative problem 
solving, including conflict resolution, adaptive management and rapid response to unprecedented 
events. New information, unanticipated change, and unprecedented events are hallmarks of 
dynamic, complex systems and require this kind of continuous learning, innovation and 
adaptation in risk management processes.       
In short, for wicked problems, better solutions are reached through extended, face-to-face, 
facilitated dialog involving diverse stakeholders.   
 
 
 
Conclusion: What Next? 
Risk assessment and management will never be perfect or solvable. Traditional, linear risk 
management paradigm has implied that it can be done, but this is no longer true for complex—
wicked—problems.  
 
This paper offers the Arctic offshore as a practical application of a wicked project environment 
and analyzes how its stakeholders define risk. Different variables of risk analysis show how and 
why risk varies among stakeholders. Drawing from a range of literature, this paper suggests 
strategies to create adaptive, participatory risk workshops involving diverse stakeholders. Even if 
the wicked problem can not be solved, this analytical framework offers a better and long-term 
approach to engage and manage stakeholders and utilize collective knowledge about project risks 
in complex projects.  
As society and projects become more complex with multiple layers of interactive complexity, the 
project management profession requires a systems view to risk management and collaborative 
strategies and institutions to address today’s increasingly wicked projects with their unique and 
complex risks.   
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APPENDIX A 
Four dimensions of Project Complexity  (Saynisch, 2010) 
Structural complexity - numerous individual structural elements; often described as 
“complicated”  
Technical complexity - Complexity in project-product, among others, from technical or 
design problems 
Directional complexity - Unshared goals and goal paths, unclear meanings and hidden 
agendas 
Temporal complexity - Results from unanticipated environmental impacts, such as 
legislative changes or civil unrest 
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APPENDIX B 
Rubric for Content Analysis#
Presentation Title:     Date:        Time:  
Presenter:      Place:         Duration:    
Content Analysis Question Answer Categories 
What type of organization is represented in this 
presentation? 
academic engineer, academic social science, engineering firm, management consulting, regulatory 
agency, leasing agency, local government 
What is the purpose, context or application for 
this definition of risk?  
 
i.e. international engineering code document, leasing and permitting, academic theory, applied case 
study 
What dimension of risk is represented?  
 
 
i.e. Engineering, operations, occupational health & safety, management, financial, economic, socio-
economic, ecological - direct, ecological - indirect (dynamic system) community perception/human 
feeling, political  
What risk paradigm is reflected in the 
presentation?  
i.e. probabilistic-deterministic, risk as a feeling, holistic, precautionary 
What is the primary data source for risk 
assessment? 
i.e. Best available geophysical, metocean and technical data, Expert judgments, local knowledge, 
systems modeling, public testimony,  
What risk attitude in the PM context is reflected 
in the presentation? 
i.e. risk averse, risk tolerant, risk neutral and risk seeking 
How much does this presentation incorporate 
diverse stakeholder perspectives, including local 
(Native) knowledge? 
i.e. scale from 1-5 
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APPENDIX C 
Seminar Schedule Fall 2010 to Spring 2011 
• Thursday September 16, 3.00pm: 
Introduction to the seminar series (H. Eicken, UAF) - @UAF 
Walt Spring (Bear Ice Technology/Shell): The international standard on Offshore Arctic 
Structures ISO 19906 - What is it? When is it to be used? How does it incorporate risk? - @UAF  
• Friday September 24, 3.00pm: 
Laura Tesch (Environmental Resources Management): Aleutians Risk Assessment Program - 
@UAA  
• Thursday October 14, 3.00pm: 
Ben Greene & Robert Suydam (North Slope Borough) NSB perspectives on risk: Where to draw 
the line? Are we willing to gamble our Maktak to attract Big-Oil? - @BARC  
• Thursday October 21, 3.00pm: 
Elke Weber (Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University): 
Understanding, communicating, and managing risks across stakeholders and cultures - @UAF  
• Friday October 22, 3.00pm: 
David Barnes (UAF): Brief update on the Arctic Council's Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response Program - @UAF  
Elke Weber (Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University): 
Understanding, communicating, and managing risks across stakeholders and cultures - @UAA  
• Friday November 5, 3.00pm: 
Gabriel Wolken (State of Alaska, DNR-DGGS): Assessing natural hazards in Alaska's coastal 
communities in a changing climate - @UAF  
Cdr. Shane Montoya (USCG): R=SP2 (Risk = Severity, Probability, Preparedness) - @UAA  
• Thursday November 11, 3.00pm: 
Andrew Metzger (UAF): Engineering aspects of ice-related risks to offshore structures - @UAF  
Seong-dae Kim (UAA): Hurricane risk analysis - @UAA  
• Thursday November 18, 3.00pm: 
Ira Rosen (Alaska Dept. Environmental Conservation) and Tim Robertson (Nuka Research): The 
Alaska Risk Assessment Project: How Does the State Assess and Manage Risks from Oil and 
Gas Development Activities? - @UAA  
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Lawson Brigham (UAF) - Risk assessment in the context of the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment and evolving International Maritime Organization Standards - @UAF  
• Thursday December 2, 3.00pm: 
Carol Holley (Pacific Environment): Risk Assessment and the Precautionary Principle: At Odds 
in the Arctic? - @UAA  
Sheila Selkregg (UAA): Cultural dissociation and risk exposure: Insights into critical decision 
making and loss of risk management commitment - @UAA  
• Thursday December 9, 3.00pm: 
Summary discussion - @UAF with participation by all sites 
Schedule / Spring Semester 2011 (as of April 11, 2011) 
• Friday, April 15th, 2011, 3:30pm: 
Scott Goldsmith (UAA; ISER): “The Economic Risks of Not Developing in the Arctic Offshore”  
Kevin Banks (Division of Oil and Gas, ADNR): "Incorporating Risk-Based Decisionmaking into 
Government Actions"  
• Thursday, April 21st, 2011, 3:30pm: 
Henry Huntington (Pew Environment Group): "Risks, Responses, Consequences: Why We 
Worry about an Arctic Oil Spill"  
Alice Bullington (Conoco-Phillips): "Capital Project Risk Management in the Arctic 
Environment"  
• Thursday, April 28th, 2011, 3:30pm:  
Jeffery Loman (BOEMRE): "Preventing Success from Breeding Complacency" 
Susan Childs (Shell): "The Safety Case: Implementing a System for Identifying and Addressing 
Risks in Offshore Operations"  
• Tuesday, May 3rd, 2011, 7pm: Panel Discussion: "Managing Oil and Gas Risks in the 
Arctic Offshore: Emerging Perspectives." Panel speakers include: 
Fran Ulmer, Fran Ulmer, Chair, US Arctic Research Commission  
Catherine Foerster, Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, "Ensuring mechanical 
integrity from exploration to abandonment in Alaska."  
Jeffrey Loman, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, "Risk 
Management – The NASA Experience"  
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Karlene Roberts, Center for Catastrophic Risk Management, UC Berkeley, "High Reliability 
Organiza1ons (HROs) and High Performance."  
• Thursday, May 5th, 2011, 3:30pm: 
Karlene Roberts (UC Berkeley; Center for Catastrophic Risk Management)  
• Friday, May 6th, 2011, 3:30pm: 
Karlene Roberts (UC Berkeley; Center for Catastrophic Risk Management)  
• Thursday, May 12th, 2011, 3:30pm: 
Hajo Eicken (UAF; IARC/Geophysical Institute): “Assessing Environmental Hazards in Arctic 
Coastal and Offshore Resource Development”  
Mandy Kaempf (UAA): “Risk Complexity: The Arctic Offshore as a Case Study” Discussion  
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APPENDIX D: Coding of Presentations 
 
 
Presentation 
# 
Presenter – 
Background  
Type of 
organization - Role 
Presentation Title Short Descriptions Topical Keywords for 
references in tables 
1 Walter Spring – 
academic engineer  
Private – 
engineering 
consulting 
The international 
standard on 
Offshore Arctic 
Structures ISO 
19906 - What is it? 
When is it to be 
used? How does it 
incorporate risk? 
Walt Spring, an engineer, works for 
Shell, and discusses the 
development of the ISO 19906 which 
is a international engineering design 
specifications standard for offshore 
structures in the Arctic.   
 
Arctic engineering risk 
methodology - ISO - 
Spring 
2 Laura Tesch – 
practitioner  
Private – risk 
consulting 
Aleutians Risk 
Assessment 
Program 
Laura Tesch, a private consultant ,  
presents the methodology for a risk 
assessment  about  maritime vessel 
traffic for the Aleutian islands which 
was conducted by a partnership 
between the state of Alaska and a 
consulting company. 
 
Aleutian - Maritime Risk 
Assessment - 
Consulting 
3 Ben Greene & 
Robert Suydam – 
academic natural 
scientist  
State management 
agency – local 
government 
NSB (North Slope 
Borough) 
perspectives on risk: 
Where to draw the 
line? Are we willing 
to gamble our 
Maktak to attract 
Big-Oil? 
Ben Greene and Robert Suydam, 
two natural scientists, present the 
NSB perspective of a precautionary 
risk approach, including historical 
context of oil and gas development 
and scientific studies about its 
impacts on water and air quality. 
 
Local Government Risk 
Perspective - NSB 
4 Elke Weber – 
academic social 
scientist 
Public – university  Understanding, 
communicating, and 
managing risks 
across stakeholders 
and cultures 
Elke Weber, an academic 
psychologist from Columbia 
University, discusses psychological 
and cognitive biases in decision 
making under uncertainty.   
 
Psychology of Risk 
Perception - academic 
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5 David Barnes – 
academic engineer  
Intergovernmental – 
international – Arctic 
Council  
Brief update on the 
Arctic Council's 
Emergency 
Prevention, 
Preparedness and 
Response Program 
(EPPR activities) 
David Barnes, an academic engineer 
and member of the EPPR working 
group at the Arctic Council, presents 
the vision, projects and current status 
of this working group.   
 
International Arctic 
EPPR Standards - AC 
6 Gabriel Wolken – 
academic social 
scientist  
State management 
and regulatory 
agency  
Assessing natural 
hazards in Alaska's 
coastal communities 
in a changing 
climate 
Gabriel Wolken, a geoscientist, 
describes how the state of Alaska 
defines and assesses geological 
risks to Alaskan coastal 
communities. 
 
Infrastructure Risk 
Assessment - SOA 
7 Shane Montoya – 
practitioner  
Federal – multi 
mission (regulation, 
enforcement, safety) 
 
The Emerging Arctic  
R=S*P 
Shane Montoya, a Coast Guard 
commander, presents challenges 
and risks the Coast Guard may face 
for future operations in the Arctic. 
 
Maritime risk 
assessment - USCG 
8 Andrew Metzger – 
academic engineer 
Public – university   Engineering aspects 
of ice-related risks to 
offshore structures 
Andrew Metzger, an academic 
engineer from UAF, discusses the 
philosophy of the international 
engineering standard for offshore 
structures -- ISO 19906. 
Arctic engineering risk 
methodology - ISO 
Metzger 
9 Seong Dae Kim – 
academic engineer 
Public – university   
Hurricane Risk 
Analysis 
Dr. Seong Dae Kim, an academic 
engineer from UAA, discusses the 
relationship between improved 
forecasting models and response 
strategies in hurricane risk analysis. 
 
Hurricane Risk 
Methodology - 
academic 
10 Ira Rosen/ Tim 
Robertson – 
practitioner  
State agency  The Alaska Risk 
Assessment Project: 
How Does the State 
Assess and Manage 
Risks from Oil and 
Gas Development 
Activities? 
Ira Rosen and Tim Robertson, a 
project manager of the Alaska 
Department of Environmental 
Conservation, present the risk 
assessment methodology utilized by 
the state of Alaska and a consulting 
company to evaluate risks in 
operating oil and gas infrastructure at 
the North Slope in Alaska.  
 
TAPS - Oil 
Infrastructure Risk 
Assessment - SOA 
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11 Lawson Brigham – 
academic social 
scientist  
Intergovernmental – 
international – Arctic 
Council  
Risk assessment in 
context of Arctic 
Marine Shipping 
Assessment and 
evolving Intl. 
Maritime 
Organization 
Standards 
Lawson Brigham, an academic social 
scientist and a member of the Arctic 
Marine Shipping assessment working 
group at the Arctic Council, presents 
challenges, risks and current project 
status from an international 
intergovernmental organization 
perspective.  
 
Arctic - Maritime Risk 
Assessment - AC 
12 Carole Holley – 
practitioner  
Non-profit – 
environmental  
Risk Assessment 
and the 
Precautionary 
Principle: At Odds in 
the Arctic? 
Carole Holley, program co-director of 
Pacific Environment, represents the 
environmental NGO perspective of a 
precautionary risk perspective. She 
discusses the historical context, its 
characteristics and differences to the 
traditional risk assessment approach. 
Environmental risk 
perspective - NGO 
13 Sheilla Selkregg – 
academic social 
scientist  
Public – university  Cultural Dissociation 
and Risk Exposure: 
Insights into Critical 
Decision Making and 
Loss of Risk 
Management 
Commitment 
Sheilla Selkregg, an academic social 
scientist, discusses the culture of risk 
as it relates to policy decision making 
about rebuilding infrastructure in 
high-risk earthquake areas. 
Risk Culture - 
academic 
14 Scott Goldsmith – 
academic economist  
Public – research 
institute  
The Economic Risks 
of Not Developing in 
the Arctic Offshore 
Scott Goldsmith, an academic 
economist at ISER, uses forecasting 
models to state the long-term threats 
to the Alaskan economy (i.e. 
employment, tax structure) and its 
residents if resource development in 
the Arctic Offshore doesn’t occur.   
Economic Risks - 
academic 
15  Kevin Banks – 
practitioner  
State agency – 
regulatory  
Incorporating Risk-
Based 
Decisionmaking into 
Government Actions  
 
Kevin Banks, regulatory 
administrator with the Division of oil 
and gas, discusses weaknesses and 
strengths of regulatory systems—the 
prescriptive (U.S.) versus the 
performance-based (European) 
system. 
Regulatory risks -- 
ADNR 
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16 Henry Huntington – 
practitioner  
Non-profit – 
research  
Risks, Responses, 
Consequences: Why 
We Worry about an 
Arctic Oil Spill"  
 
Henry Huntington from the Pew 
Environment group, an 
environmental research NGO, 
summarizes the results of a research 
study about the capability of cleaning 
up an Arctic oil spill.  
Environmental Risk – 
Pew NGO 
17  Alice Bullington – 
practitioner  
Private – industry  Capital Project Risk 
Management in the 
Arctic Environment 
Alice Bullington, a risk manager of 
Conoco Phillips’s capital projects, 
discusses the internal risk 
management process to manage 
schedule, cost and scope risks.  
Project risks – Conoco 
Phillips  
18  Jeffrey Loman – 
practitioner (retired) 
Federal – regulatory  Preventing Success 
from Breeding 
Complacency 
 
Jeffrey Loman, a former federal 
regulator, compares his personal 
experiences of different safety 
cultures at BOEMRE and the NAVY 
Regulatory risks: 
Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, 
Regulation and 
Enforcement 
(BOEMRE) 
19 Susan Childs – 
practitioner  
Private – industry  The Safety Case: 
Implementing a 
System for 
Identifying and 
Addressing Risks in 
Offshore Operations"  
 
Susan Childs of Shell explains the 
safety case as a risk methodology to 
identify and address oil spill risk in 
the Alaskan Arctic offshore. The bow 
tie reflects the process to prevent 
and respond to oil spill risks.  
Process risks – Shell  
20 Catherine Foerster – 
practitioner  
State – regulatory  Panel: Ensuring 
mechanical integrity 
from exploration to 
abandonment in 
Alaska. 
Catherine Foerster, a state regulator, 
describes the regulatory challenges 
of maintaining the mechanical 
integrity of oil and gas infrastructure. 
Regulatory risks – 
Alaska Oil and Gas 
Conservation 
Commission (AOGCC) 
21 Karlene Roberts – 
academic 
psychologist 
Public - university  High Reliability 
Organizations 
(HROs) and High 
Performance 
Karlene Roberts, an academic 
psychologist, discusses her research 
results about studying different types 
of high reliability organizations such 
as nuclear power industry, chemical 
industry and aircraft carriers.    
Organizational 
management risks - 
academic 
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22 Hajo Eicken – 
academic 
geophysist  
Public – university  Assessing 
Environmental 
Hazards in Arctic 
Coastal and 
Offshore Resource 
Development 
Hajo Eicken, an academic 
geophysicist, explains his research 
about changes in multi-year sea ice 
and their effects on the environment 
and infrastructure.   
Geophysical risks – 
academic  
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APPENDIX E 
Risk Identification Data Used by each Stakeholder 
Primary data source - risk assessment 
   Quantitative - 
hard Qualitative - soft Complementary 
# 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
Topical Key words risk source 
Geophysical, 
metocean and 
technical 
Expert 
judgment 
Lessons 
Learned 
Local 
knowledge 
Public 
testimony 
Social science 
research - 
interviews, 
experimental 
studies 
Systems modeling 
1 Arctic engineering risk methodology - ISO-Spring 
oil & gas 
infrastructure X X      
2 Aleutian - Maritime Risk Assessment - Consulting 
maritime 
transportation X X   X  X 
3 
 
Local Government Risk 
Perspective - NSB 
 
oil & gas 
infrastructure 
X   X X   
4 Psychology of Risk 
Perception - academic 
risky decision-
making 
   X  X  
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5 International Arctic EPPR Standards - AC 
oil & gas 
infrastructure, 
maritime 
transportation 
X X     X 
 Psychology of Risk Perception - academic 
risky decision-
making    X  X  
6 Infrastructure Risk Assessment - SOA 
geophysical 
hazards X   X   X 
7 Maritime risk assessment - USCG 
maritime 
transportation X  X     
8 Arctic engineering risk methodology-ISO-Metzger 
oil & gas 
infrastructure X X      
9 Hurricane Risk Methodology - academic hurricanes X      X 
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10 TAPS - Oil Infrastructure Risk Assessment - SOA 
oil 
infrastructure  X X  X   
11 Arctic - Maritime Risk Assessment - AC 
maritime 
transportation X      X 
12 Environmental risk perspective - NGO 
human 
induced -  oil 
& gas 
infrastructure 
& operation 
   X X X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Risk Culture - Academic 
 
natural hazard 
induced - 
earthquakes 
  X  
 
X 
 
X 
 
X  
 
 
14 
 
 
Economic Risks - 
academic 
 
Oil & gas 
development 
 X    X  X 
15 Regulatory risks -- ADNR Oil & gas development X X X  X X 
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16 Environmental Risk – Pew NGO 
Oil & gas 
development   X   X 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Project risks – Conoco Phillips 
Oil & gas 
capital 
projects 
X X X    
 
 
 
X 
 
18 
Regulatory risks – 
BOEMRE Oil & gas development X X X  X X 
 
 
 
 
 
19 Process risks – Shell Oil & gas development X X X    
 
 
 
X 
 
20 Regulatory risks - AOGCC Oil & gas infrastructure X X X    
 
 
 
 
 
21 
Organizational 
management risks (HRO) - 
academic 
Project 
management 
risks 
 X X X  X 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Geophysical risks – academic 
Environmental
- geophysical X   X   
 
 
X 
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APPENDIX F 
Risk Attitudes#
Risk 
Seeking 
 
Risk Tolerant 
 
Risk Neutral Risk Averse 
 
 
Arctic 
Engineering risk 
methodology – 
ISO - Spring 
Arctic 
Engineering risk 
methodology – 
ISO - Metzger 
Economic Risks 
- academic 
Aleutian - Maritime Risk Assessment – 
consulting 
Hurricane risk methodology – modeling 
Infrastructure Risk Assessment –  SOA 
International Arctic EPPR Standards – 
AC 
Arctic - Maritime Risk Assessment – AC 
Infrastructure risk assessment – 
academic 
TAPS – Oil Infrastructure Risk 
assessment – SOA 
Psychology of Risk – academic 
Regulatory risks -- ADNR 
Project risks – Conoco Phillips 
Regulatory risks - BOEMRE 
Process risks – Shell 
Regulatory risks – Alaska Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission 
Geophysical risks – academic 
 
Local government risk perspective – NSB 
Environmental risk perspective – NGO 
Maritime risk assessment – USCG  
Environmental Risk – Pew NGO 
Organizational management risks - 
academic 
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APPENDIX G 
Summary of techniques and their contribution to understanding wicked projects (adapted 
from Andrew Finegan, 2010, p.3) 
 Theory   Contribution to Wicked Projects  
SSM – Soft Systems Methodology  Good at helping to better understand what to do about 
“the mess”. It can be incorporated into stakeholder and 
requirements analysis.  
AR/AL – Action Research/ Action Learning  Assess in a better understanding of dynamic processes, 
and assist the management of innovation and change.  
SDM – System Dynamics Modelling The resultant models can provide an improved 
understanding by mapping the dynamic complexity of 
the project. It is useful to define cause-effect 
relationships. SDM can also be used to produce a post-
mortem analysis of the project.   
ANT – Actor Network Theory  Assist in tracing the relations in actor-networks, and 
encourage active participation and communication 
between different stakeholders and key players. 
GT – Grounded Theory Assist in the analysis of organizational contexts, and the 
analysis of issues in complex projects. 
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APPENDIX H 
Traditional Risk Management vs. Risk Leadership (adapted from Hancock, 2010, p.87) 
Risk Management Risk Leadership 
Works to a defined scope, budget, quality and 
programme. 
Recognizes the possibility of different outcomes and 
tries to ensure that risk activities are directed towards 
making an acceptable set of outcomes more likely. 
Uses the instrumental lifecycle image of risk 
management as a linear sequence of tasks to be 
performed on an objective entity using codified 
knowledge, procedures and techniques, and based 
on an image of projects as apolitical production 
processes.  
Uses concepts and images which focus on social 
interaction among people, understanding the flux of 
events and human interaction, and the framing of 
projects within an array of social agenda, practices, 
stakeholder relations, politics and power. 
Manages process to ensure complicated projects of 
people and technology are kept running smoothly.  
Develops behaviors and confidence in team through 
scenario-planning and team-building to identify and 
respond to risks and opportunities.  
Establishes detailed steps, processes and timetables 
for risk management. 
Understands the ‘many acceptable futures’ proposition 
and manages risk to produce the changes needed to 
achieve the acceptable outcomes.   
Practitioners as implementers of the risk process. 
Training and development which produces 
practitioners who can follow detailed procedures 
and techniques that are prescribed by project 
management methods and tools. 
Practitioners as reflective listeners. Learning and 
development facilitates the development of reflective 
practitioners who can learn, operate and adapt 
effectively in complex project environments, through 
experience, intuition and the pragmatic application of 
theory in practice.  
Applies concepts and methodologies which focus 
on risk management for product creation or 
improvement of a physical product, system or 
facility, etc., and monitored and controlled against 
specification (quality), cost and time. 
Applies concepts and frameworks which focus on risk 
management as value creation, whilst aware that ‘value’ 
and ‘benefit’ will have multiple meanings linked to 
different purposes for the organization, project and 
individual. 
Attempts to control risk by monitoring results, 
identifying deviations from the plan and 
developing mitigation actions to return to plan.  
Adapts the risk process to overcome major political, 
bureaucratic and resource barriers to develop change in 
behaviors through trust and managing expectations.  
Based on the assumptions that the risk model is 
(assumed to be) the actual terrain (i.e. the actual 
reality out there in the world). 
Based on the development of new risk models and 
theories which recognize and take cognizance of the 
complexity of projects and project management at all 
levels and that the model is only part of the complex 
terrain.  
Seeks predictability and order.  Has learnt to live with chaos, complexity and 
uncertainty, and leads through example to a successful 
conclusion.  
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